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Abstract 
In a recent discussion paper, Miles and Mezzich described person-centered medicine (PCM) as a model of modern medical 
practice that has emerged from the intellectual currents of the past century. In this commentary, we consider what PCM has 
to offer as a model for the clinical encounter and for clinical judgement. The doctor-patient relationship is an important 
thread in a person-centered medicine that visualizes the clinical encounter as a dialogue between two persons. Person-
centered clinical judgement is concerned with the individual clinical case and as such is integrative, context-sensitive, 
interpretive and circumstantial. A care model incorporating these elements of dialogue and individualized judgement is ideal 
for older patients, for whom population-level guidelines are often inapplicable, who are often dependent on other persons 
and who are heterogeneous in their needs. As such a model, PCM is the dialectic synthesis arising out of decades of conflict 
between patient-centered medicine, and its antithesis, evidence-based medicine. If PCM is to progress from a prescriptive 
model to a descriptive model of modern medicine, its proponents must claim its philosophical commitments, keeping in 
mind that a model is fundamentally instrumental and not necessarily always literal. Medicine should look to a care model 
that is person-centered in the ways described here and that keeps the rational, virtuous and humane elements of practice in 
balance. 
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Introduction 
 
“Increasingly, the profession that we appeal to in our direst 
need is becoming – in hospital and out – a medicine of 
strangers. Little wonder that contemporary physicians 
locate medicine’s healing authority in science rather than in 
its best, most authentic source, the care of patients” – 
Kathryn Montgomery [1]. 
 
“At its best such a [randomized controlled] trial shows 
what can be accomplished with a medicine under careful 
observation and certain restricted conditions. The same 
results will not invariably or necessarily be observed when 
the medicine passes into general use; but the trial has at the 
least provided background knowledge which the physician 
can adapt to the individual patient” (emphasis added) – 
Austin Bradford Hill [2]. 
 
The ‘Medicine of the Person’ movement has been re-
imagined, re-invigorated and re-branded as person-
centered medicine (PCM). In their discussion paper ‘The 
care of the patient and the soul of the clinic: person-
centered medicine as an emergent model of modern 
clinical practice’, published in the International Journal of 
Person Centered Medicine [3], Miles and Mezzich supply 
the context for what furthermore represents a 
reconstitution of the humanistic movement into a new 
medical model, a model for patient care. In this response to 
their panoramic analysis of developments relevant to the 
evolution of PCM over the last 100 or so years, we propose 
that the two core components of their person-centered 
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medical model are the relationship between the persons of 
the physician and patient and the individualization of care. 
These pillars are capable of serving as the basis for clinical 
judgment and the clinical encounter, both of which should 
be accounted for in a complete ‘model of modern clinical 
practice’ [3]. We make the case that PCM is a particularly 
pertinent model for the quality care of older patients, a 
fast-growing demographic in developed societies. We 
consider the nature of the ‘coalescence’ of the evidence-
based medicine (EBM) and patient-centered care (PCC) 
movements described by the authors. Finally, we suggest 
what is needed if PCM is to progress from a prescriptive to 
a descriptive model of modern medicine.  
Recapitulation 
A brief reprise of the historical narrative told by Miles and 
Mezzich [3] will serve to illustrate the origins and 
foundations of the PCM model. Their story begins in the 
early Twentieth Century with a looming crisis in medicine, 
when young clinicians, enthusiastic about the rapidly 
expanding science base of medicine, began to practice a 
kind of medicine more akin to applied science than a 
healing profession informed by science [3]. Miles and 
Mezzich identify the origins of ‘Medicine of the Person’, a 
humanistic movement, with Peabody and Tournier. A 
caring disposition had been the mark of the virtuous 
clinician in previous eras when doctors could comfort 
always, but cure rarely. In The Care of the Patient (1927) 
[4], Francis Peabody lamented the lack of feeling for the 
patient displayed by novice physicians embracing the 
science of medicine. Paul Tournier later added his voice to 
the discourse with a call for a medecine de la personne [5] 
- an integrated style of practice that that was concerned 
with the whole person of the patient. Peabody and Tournier 
advocated for a re-orientation of the medical ‘gaze’, so that 
the patient would be seen as a fully contextualized person, 
with a unique phenomenology, situated in their own 
physical and social world. 
At the time George Engel published his seminal work 
‘The need for a new medical model: a challenge for 
biomedicine’ (1977), he believed that a reductionist, 
disease-centered ‘biomedicine’ had become the dominant 
medical model [6]. Beyond its function as a conceptual 
model of the patient, Engel intended for his contrasting 
biopsychosocial model to direct a far more humane patient 
care [7]. Levenstein and colleagues also suggested a model 
of care for family practice in the form of the ‘patient-
centered clinical method’ [8], a relationship-centered 
medicine in which the physician’s agenda is balanced with 
that of the patient. These two methods for the application 
of a person-centered frame of reference to the practice of 
medicine marked the beginning of the evolution of 
Tournier’s ‘Medicine of the Person’ from an ideal to a 
nascent medical model. 
Miles and Mezzich note that as the patient-centered 
nomenclature became popular, it was inconsistently used 
to describe schools of thought differing in subtle or even 
substantial ways, though all were concerned with the 
individual patient. As a diverse collection of ideologies, 
patient-centered care is a “patient empowerment initiative” 
[3], but due to a lack of agreement on theory or even 
outcomes, it is not a coherent model of practice. Alongside 
PCC, a radically different evidence-based medicine (EBM) 
movement grew out of the concern that modern medicine 
was not efficiently and effectively integrating the mounting 
external evidence generated by research into practice. 
From the outset, EBM was criticized on many points [3], 
including the unquestioning faith in the superiority of 
evidence generated through clinical research, especially 
randomized controlled trials (RCTs) [9-14]. Despite serial 
reconstitutions of the EBM model over 2 decades [15], the 
problem of how to apply evidence generated from 
epidemiological studies or RCTs to the individual patient 
[2,14,16-18] was never adequately addressed. Therefore, in 
its current form, EBM stands in stark contrast to person-
centeredness and it is unclear to us how it could be 
modified to fit the demands of modern patient care without 
abandoning the core tenets of the ideology, including what 
it means to EBM proponents to be evidence-based. 
Following Hartzband and Groopman [19], Miles and 
Mezzich propose that EBM and PCC must coalesce [3]. 
The result would be a medicine informed by evidence 
generated by science, deeply committed to the care of the 
individual patient and situated in the relationship between 
the persons of the patient and clinician. As an addition to 
previous person-centered models [7,8], PCM makes 
explicit the need to address the challenges of incorporating 
various warrants for decision-making into the complex 
process of clinical judgement [3]. Miles and Mezzich 
articulate “a vision…of medicine as a science-using and 
compassionate practice, centered upon the persons of the 
patient and the clinician(s) engaged in a mutual and 
dialogical process of shared decision-making, focused on 
the patient’s best interests, within a relationship of 
equality, responsibility and trust”. Person-centered 
medicine is offered as a potential realization of that vision 
and an antidote to de-personalization in medicine or, as 
they conclude, “an emergent model of modern clinical 
practice for our times” [3]. 
PCM and the doctor-patient 
relationship 
As a relationship-focused model of practice, PCM 
concerns the clinical encounter or the interaction between 
clinician and patient. The humanistic movement in 
medicine has often associated de-personalized care with an 
impersonal relationship between a patient and their 
physician(s) [4,6,20] that often manifests when the care 
team is large, as is commonly the case within the hospital 
setting. The clinician may be more interested in the 
meaning of physical signs and reported symptoms in the 
context of their taxonomy of disease and less interested in 
the meaning of these manifestations for the patient, which 
is entirely personal. In order to make their experiences 
meaningful - to make sense of it all, persons order and 
express these as a narrative [21]. A person-centered model 
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of care emphasizes caring about the patient’s illness 
narrative and the unique subjectivity of the patient. In 
PCM, the ethical character of the exemplary clinician is 
partly revealed by their caring disposition towards the 
patient as a person, beyond the respectful disposition 
towards the patient as an autonomous agent that is often 
central to appeals for ‘patient-centeredness’. 
Buetow notes that in a person-centered model of the 
clinical encounter, doctor and patient are “co-producers of 
care” [22], capturing the sharing of responsibility and 
decisions that would naturally take place in a relationship 
where both parties recognize and appreciate the 
perspective, knowledge and roles brought to the encounter 
by the other. Both clinician and patient have valuable self-
knowledge and external knowledge. For the clinician, self-
knowledge takes the form of insight concerning one’s own 
abilities, limitations, values and goals and external 
knowledge consists of evidence from their own clinical 
experience, scientific theory and the clinical literature. For 
the patient, self-knowledge takes the form of insight into 
one’s own state of positive or negative wellbeing, values 
and goals and external knowledge consists of evidence 
from past experiences, from the experiences of others and 
from their own investigations. In a relationship of equality 
promoted by Miles and Mezzich [3], no particular kind of 
knowledge can have universal authority over other kinds 
and the flow of knowledge must be bidirectional. 
Both parties also bring different roles to the 
relationship. Physician roles have recently become 
important as part of the CanMeds Physician Competency 
Framework, which describes 7 roles for the physician: 
Medical Expert, Communicator, Collaborator, Manager, 
Health Advocate, Scholar and Professional [23]. Designed 
by The Royal College of Physicians and Surgeons of 
Canada, the CanMeds Framework is now used to generate 
curriculum objectives and assess trainees in undergraduate 
and postgraduate medical training around the world. 
Regrettably, while the Person role was taken to be an 
important physician role in a precursor to CanMeds [24], it 
was subsequently abandoned. Person-centered medicine 
laudably reclaims the person as the lost physician role - 
one that should be brought to the clinical encounter to 
ensure frank honesty about the fallibility of the Medical 
Expert and the imperfect nature of their clinical judgement. 
Only models that admit, rather than conceal, the 
uncertainty of clinical practice and the personal nature of 
clinical judgement in a way that EBM never fully has, 
adequately capture the true nature of medicine. A frank 
recognition of all of the roles and responsibilities of the 
two persons engaged in the therapeutic relationship, 
including the doctor’s obligations to the healthcare system 
and profession and both parties’ obligations to themselves 
and each other, within a trusting relationship, is necessary 
for establishing a mutual understanding and mutual 
expectations. The doctor-patient relationship modeled by 
PCM is, therefore, a more thoughtful and valuable 
depiction of the clinical encounter than either the 
inherently clinician-centered EBM or patient-centered 
care. 
The description of PCM as a ‘dialogical process’ 
[3,25] invites the recognition that there is a multitude of 
different dialogues that take place in the clinic, not all of 
which consider a decision to be the primary outcome of the 
conversation [17]. Doctor-patient dialogues may have the 
expressed or unexpressed purpose of persuasion, the 
negotiation of therapeutic goals, the seeking of information 
or deliberation and decision-making [10]. In some of these 
dialogues there is an obvious pull in one direction or the 
other (either doctor or patient may persuade or seek 
information from the other). In the rest of these dialogues, 
the process should be completely shared (negotiation and 
decision-making should involve a mutual consideration of 
the perspectives of both clinician and patient). A person-
centered practitioner would add to this list of dialogues 
those encounters concerned with comforting and 
consoling, which necessarily polarize the clinician as the 
person caring for the patient and the ill person in the 
relationship as the one being cared for. 
The doctor-patient relationship remains central for 
medicine, but in keeping with Upshur’s analysis [26], 
Miles and Mezzich propose that “medicine does not have 
or need a base” [3]. Thus, PCM does not rest on a 
foundation built from this relationship or from any other 
singular element of practice, in contrast to the way 
medicine is said to be based on evidence, narrative or 
values, according to other schools of thought [25]. As a 
metaphor, a base is highly restrictive and in fact only 
useful in relation to simple, static entities that require an 
equally simple and static grounding. To capture the 
complex and interprofessional nature of medicine, Upshur 
brings to mind a metaphor employed skillfully by C.S. 
Peirce: that of a cable. “With its intertwined strands, the 
cable gains its strength, not by having a single golden 
thread that winds its way through the whole. No one 
golden strand defines the whole” [27]. If medicine is a 
cable, then the doctor-patient relationship represents an 
important strand connecting both persons across a great 
divide. When the strand frays, doctor and patient are cast 
apart and the whole is weakened. When the strand is 
reinforced, it brings both parties together and strengthens 
the fundamental enterprise of medicine. 
PCM and the individualization of 
care 
Those who have sounded the alarm in response to what 
they perceive to be an increasing de-personalization of 
clinical practice have often emphasized one particular 
prong of this claim, that is, a forgotten clinical imperative 
to comfort, console and care for the patient [11]. However, 
de-personalized care can encompass a plurality of 
meanings, including patient management that neglects the 
particularity of the presenting patient and their 
circumstances. In the contrasting approach to clinical 
judgment offered by a person-centered frame, 
individualized care is integrative, context-sensitive, 
interpretive and circumstantial. 
Integrative refers to the incorporation of diverse kinds 
of knowledge into the process of clinical judgement. 
Insofar as every clinical decision is made toward some 
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desirable outcome, every decision has an ethical 
component that is addressed by integrating patient values 
and desires into decision-making. In an evidence-informed 
individualized care model, the clinician also weighs 
general, external evidence against a particular knowledge 
of the patient. The general/particular challenge of 
integrative care is discussed elsewhere [1,9,12,28] and is 
especially vexing when determining how general evidence 
from epidemiological studies or clinical trials can be 
applied to the care of the individual patient [2,14,16-18], 
given his/her unique biology, demographic characteristics, 
history, health status, goals and values. As a context-
sensitive model, individualized care recognizes that the 
patient is also situated within a particular socio-cultural 
space, that the patient’s relation to the world and their 
psychological state influence care and that these 
biopsychosocial dimensions of the patient may, in fact, be 
a vera causa of disease [6]. Individualized care sees 
clinical knowing as an interpretive or hermeneutical 
[29,30] exercise, in which cultural and historical context, 
including personal experience, shapes meaning for 
clinician and patient alike. Finally, clinical judgement is 
highly circumstantial. This final statement hangs on the 
conviction that every patient is unique and as such, 
clinicians must avoid so called ‘cookbook medicine’ and 
overly categorical thinking. 
As Miles and Mezzich have identified [3], a casuistic 
approach to clinical judgement, resembling the case-based 
approach to ethics [31], is well suited to a model that 
individualizes care. In the method advanced by Tonelli 
[13,32], the clinician integrates several kinds of warrants 
into decision-making (empirical evidence, experiential 
evidence, pathophysiologic rationale, patient goals and 
values and system features). Unlike in a hierarchical 
approach to the evidentiary basis of decision-making, in 
medical casuistry “[t]he relative weight to be assigned to 
each of these potential warrants for action depends upon 
the particulars of the case at hand” [13]. Most of the kinds 
of warrants listed are of a general nature, but they must be 
integrated with knowledge of the patient’s particular goals 
and values, as well as their physical findings and details 
from their illness narrative. Implicit in the casuistic 
approach is the reasoning that clinical thinking must be 
circumstantial or ‘case-based’, rather than formulaic and 
must not be constrained by dogmatic rule-following. 
Conscious of the importance of context, the physician may 
choose to widen his/her ‘gaze’ upon the contextual 
background of the case at hand and must bring particular 
aspects of the case into the foreground at different times. 
Finally, casuistry is a fundamentally interpretive exercise 
and, as such, permits multiple contrasting inferences to be 
drawn from the same warrants [13,30]. 
While Tonelli’s approach offers a good starting point 
upon which to develop a person-centered model of clinical 
judgement, his is not the first identification of a link 
between medicine and casuistry [33], nor is his the only 
approach, in general, that recognizes the importance of the 
particulars of the clinical case. Phronesis or practical 
reasoning [1,34], narrative-based medicine [35] and 
interpretive medicine [36] also rest on the uniqueness of 
each case and these methods can offer further insight for 
proponents of PCM seeking to advance a casuistic model 
of clinical judgement. 
The act of judgement is not confined to clinical 
encounters in which a decision is to be reached. Warrants 
can more broadly serve as premises supporting any 
argument taking place within the clinical setting. While 
Horton described the argument as “the fundamental unit of 
medical thought” [36], it can also be seen as the syntax of 
clinical reasoning, which is a kind of explicit thinking. 
Argumentation is both the grammar of the clinician’s 
internal monologue when deliberating over the details of 
the case and the grammar of certain doctor-patient 
dialogues, such as those involving persuasion or decision-
making. A great strength of the relationship-centric 
account of the clinical encounter modeled by PCM is that 
it supports a dual locus of clinical reasoning, where 
reasoning takes place both within the traditional context of 
the physician’s internal monologue and also within 
dialogical contexts. In Walton’s concept of dialectical 
argumentation [37], the nature of the dialogical argument 
depends on the nature of the conversation taking place. 
Walton’s typology, which includes 6 ‘contexts for 
conversation’, can be applied to the clinical encounter [10] 
to categorize the dialogical types of clinical reasoning. 
Taken together, dialectical argumentation and medical 
casuistry provide a powerful approach to clinical 
judgement and an equally powerful description of the 
personal nature of clinical practice. 
The care of older patients 
The unique difficulties of caring for older patients, whether 
in our communities, hospitals or care facilities, challenge 
our modern methods of healthcare delivery and indeed our 
very philosophy of care [38]. Countries are in the midst of 
an escalating global crisis of aging and chronic disease 
[39,40], which neither EBM nor PCC have adequately 
addressed. From an EBM standpoint, evidence-based, 
disease-centered clinical practice guidelines, which are 
intended to optimally direct care, often lack understanding 
of or have a poor evidence base for this population [41-43] 
and may even conflict with one another when applied 
concurrently for a single multi-morbid patient [43]. 
Geriatric patients are usually excluded from RCTs due to 
their advanced age or co-morbidities [44-46] and the 
inferential leap from the existing trial evidence to the older 
patient (a leap of faith, to be sure) is perilous. On the other 
hand, the lens of PCC is often too narrowly focussed on 
the patient alone [22,25], which is not ideal for those older 
patients who are heavily dependent on others, whose 
autonomy is compromised by disease or disability and 
whose needs and preferences can only be considered 
alongside those of their caregiver(s). In their discussion 
paper, Miles and Mezzich are justified in saying that PCM 
“is of very particular applicability and value in the 
management of chronic disease” [3]. Person-centered 
medicine is, then, also valuable in the management of older 
patients, as a population suffering with a high burden of 
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chronic diseases and for whom current teaching and 
practice models are inadequate [47,48]. 
Older patients constitute an unusually heterogeneous 
group [48,49]. These patients vary greatly in their 
comorbid conditions [50], health services utilization [51], 
social history [49] and functional status [38], among other 
characteristics. Thus, a one-size-fits-all approach to their 
management is unsatisfactory. A new, personalized 
approach to the care of the elderly is much-needed, in 
addition to one that is holistic in its consideration of the 
patient. Snaedal identified that the psychological and social 
needs of older patients are pronounced compared to those 
of younger patients [49]. There is a high prevalence of 
dementia and cognitive impairment among the elderly 
[52], along with an increased need for support with daily 
living. In addition to psychological and social needs, older 
patients have complex treatment needs that are not being 
met by conventional therapeutic approaches [38,48]. 
Lastly, their existential needs, which are often overlooked 
by existing care models, are in critical need of addressing 
within each consultation. Existential needs include the 
opportunity for the patient to define their own health and 
wellbeing, dictate their conditions of living and goals for 
life and, importantly, determine their own care near the end 
of life. None of these diverse needs can be met outside of a 
medical model that includes, within the therapeutic circle, 
multiple persons beyond the patient. 
Older patients require medical care described by 
Mezzich and colleagues as being (1) of the person, (2) for 
the person, (3) by the person and (4) with the person [3], a 
care model that: (1) admits knowledge of the unique 
functional and health status of the patient, (2) strives to 
address the psychological, social, therapeutic and 
existential needs of the patient, (3) recognizes the 
limitations of the knowledge and evidence that the 
physician brings to the encounter and (4) maintains that the 
goals of therapy should be decided in partnership with the 
patient and often their caregiver(s). This is the kind of 
medical model that, in our interpretation, PCM seeks to be. 
A coalescence of EBM and PCC? 
In an article in the New England Journal of Medicine, 
Hartzband and Groopman call for the coalescence of the 
EBM movement and medical humanism, where medical 
humanism is the movement that “seeks to understand the 
patient as a person, focusing on individual values, goals 
and preferences with respect to clinical decisions” [19]. 
This rendering of medical humanism captures much of the 
definition of patient-centeredness offered by the Institute 
of Medicine (IOM) in the U.S. [53]. Along the same lines 
as Hartzband and Groopman, Miles and Mezzich propose 
that “the time has come for EBM and patient-centered care 
to coalesce” [3]. However, they also point to “a 
foundational irreconcilability between the fundamental 
principles of EBM and those of patient-centered care”. 
What at first might seem like a contradiction between these 
two statements can be clarified by speculating on the 
nature of the coalescence suggested by the authors. 
A clue to the meaning of coalescence as it is used by 
Miles and Mezzich is found in their explanation for the 
appearance of PCM as the result of a “Hegelian synthesis” 
[3]. The authors allude to the dialectic triad of thesis, 
antithesis and synthesis commonly (mis)attributed to the 
German philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel [54]. 
According to this pattern, one of PCC or EBM would be 
seen as a thesis and the other as its antithesis, thus 
capturing the ‘foundational irreconcilability’ between the 
2. This irreconcilability arises out of the primacy placed on 
individual patient-determined outcomes in PCC and the 
privileging of study designs that measure population 
average, ‘evidence-based’ outcomes in EBM. As a 
resolution to the conflict between PCC and EBM, the 
‘Hegelian synthesis’ is not the triumph of one movement 
over the other, but a wholly new model that reconciles the 
relative strengths of both. Through a dialectic process, out 
of decades of conflict between an evidence-based and a 
patient-centered approach to clinical practice, an apparent 
synthesis has been achieved in PCM, the evidence-
informed, person-centered model described by Miles and 
Mezzich [3]. 
If PCM truly combines the strengths of EBM and 
PCC, as suggested [3], it is worth considering what the 
relative strengths of both movements are. In EBM, we find 
the mantra that the clinician must stay abreast of the 
constantly accumulating medical literature [55]. In the 
earlier EBM literature, we also find the idea that the 
critical evaluation of external evidence is an important 
clinical competency [56]. In PCC, we see that important 
consideration is given to the patient’s preferences, needs 
and values, as well as their involvement in their own care 
[53]. We believe that these aspects of EBM and PCC are 
worthy of inclusion within a new medical model. Further 
thought should be given to how EBM and PCC can 
constructively collaborate to enhance person-centered care. 
 
From emergence to prevalence: the 
road ahead 
Person-centered medicine is both an emergent movement 
and a patient care model. As a patient care model, PCM 
encapsulates both the clinical encounter and clinical 
judgement, which together account for the doctor-patient 
relationship, the doctor-patient dialogue, the ethics of 
practice, physician roles, clinical reasoning, clinical 
decision-making and the traditional domains of patient 
management, including diagnosis and treatment. As a 
relationship-focused model of care, it is currently most 
applicable to primary care, where continuity in the doctor-
patient relationship is most common: this is also where 
complex older patients are most often managed. The model 
which Miles and Mezzich advocate to replace “impersonal, 
fragmented and de-contextualized systems of healthcare” 
[3], is normative, but not yet descriptive, of modern patient 
care. In order for PCM to become an ascendant model and 
describe the way physicians practice, further work is 
needed in establishing its theory and application. 
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In their discussion paper, Miles and Mezzich discuss 
what is needed to successfully implement person-
centeredness in medical practice, including the need for the 
development and testing of person-centered approaches 
specific to various aspects of care [3], building upon 
approaches to diagnosis [57], disease management [49,58] 
and medication management [59] recently proposed. From 
a theoretical standpoint, PCM proponents must also 
explicitly claim the philosophical commitments of their 
model, including the metaphysics of personhood. Here, 
Miles and Mezzich endorse the holistic conception of the 
person advanced by Cassell [60] and could further draw 
upon perspectives in phenomenology [61], organicism [62] 
and mind-body dualism [63], among others. A fuller 
description of this autonomy is needed - this too is a task 
for philosophy, as well as bioethics. Medical epistemology 
has burgeoned over the past two decades as scholars have 
considered evidence and reasoning in relation to practice. 
The philosophy of science has contributed directly to the 
debates on medical statistics and clinical study 
methodology. These last two areas of inquiry have much to 
offer an emergent medical model that must struggle with 
how to apply scientific knowledge as part of individualized 
care. 
As proponents of PCM endorse certain philosophical 
positions, they should keep in mind that a medical model is 
fundamentally instrumental. Analogous to the way in 
which the instrumentalist perspective conceives of 
scientific theories in the philosophy of science [64], a 
medical model is not a collection of statements about the 
medical world that should be evaluated as true or false, but 
rather a tool used to achieve patient health and wellbeing. 
If a kind of instrumentalist position is adopted by PCM, it 
matters not whether the nature of the person, as depicted in 
the model, is true to reality or presents a constructed 
version of reality. The only relevant consideration in 
deciding what metaphysical positions on personhood to 
assume is how these will influence patient care when the 
model is put into practice. Instrumentalism may offer 
useful insight for philosophers interested in reflecting on 
the nature and function of models of clinical practice. 
Conclusion 
One of us was recently engaged in conversation with a 
second-year medical student, explicating the problems with 
EBM. The student agreed with the logic of the arguments 
presented, but perhaps influenced by the rhetorical force of 
the term evidence-based, they replied, “if not evidence-
based medicine, then what?” Miles and Mezzich provide 
an inspired answer to that question in their discussion 
paper [3]. There is a rapidly developing alternative to other 
dichotomized models of practice that could have its 
greatest impact on the care of individuals with many 
medical, psychological and social issues, such as older 
patients. In these contexts, only a personalized approach 
will do. In our analysis, PCM is an emergent model of the 
clinical encounter and clinical judgement for all clinicians 
involved in patient care, which endeavors to be a complete, 
descriptive medical model. 
Two decades ago, evidence-based medicine arose with 
a focus on science and rationality, the logos of medicine. 
Meanwhile, a separate patient-centered care movement 
was developing with a focus on the individual patient and 
the moral character of their physician, the ethos of 
medicine. In their current incarnations, neither EBM nor 
PCC are sufficient as care models. Long before either of 
these movements, medical humanism called for physicians 
to return the profession to its caring roots, the pathos of 
medicine. Marcum also discusses the relationship between 
medicine’s logos, ethos and pathos [65]. In his view, “only 
a wise and loving stance will resolve the quality-of-care 
crisis in modern medicine”. Medical humanists declare that 
we must restore the feeling to the medical profession, 
which has been lost over a century of unprecedented 
progress in the science of medicine. It seems undeniable to 
us that medicine must embrace a model of care that keeps 
the logos, ethos and pathos of medicine in balance, if it 
hopes to heal itself and rise to the challenges of caring for 
patients in the Twenty-First Century. 
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